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Abstract - Many RFID tags and contactless smart cards use
proprietary security mechanisms for authentication and confiden-
tiality. There are several examples in the literature showing that
once these mechanisms have been reverse engineered, their secu-
rity turns out to be unsatisfactory. Since the use of these tags is
quickly expanding to access control and ticketing systems, it is im-
portant to independently assess their security. In this paper, we
propose three tools for the analysis of RFID protocols. These tools
facilitate message eavesdropping and emulation of both tags and
readers. The tools focus on high frequency tags but one of them
also supports low frequency. These tools are fully programable
and allow for quick prototyping, testing and debugging of new
RFID protocols. All the software, firmware and hardware we have
developed that is described here is open source and open design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) is one of the most pervasive
technologies nowadays. It was first introduced for identification pur-
poses only, but quickly expanded to other applications like transport
ticketing systems and access control. The security and privacy of these
systems is often overlooked. This is, to a good extend, due to the
fact that it is hard to know what are the underlying security mecha-
nisms employed. A surprisingly large number of access control sys-
tems use the tag’s unique identifier (UID) as their only security mech-
anism. Moreover, large scale ticketing systems use simple memory
cards [1–4] for fare collection. This type of cards lack any crypto-
graphic capabilities and therefore the security of these systems relies
on UID blacklisting mechanisms. When portable tag-emulating de-
vices are available [5–7], these security mechanisms become obsolete.
Manufacturers often claim that their tags provide ‘state-of-the-art’,
‘field-proven’ or ‘unbreakable’ security, but it is hard to know what
this means and how much security you actually get. The widely used
RFID communication standards like [8–12] define the low-level trans-
mission layers. However, these standards do not include any details
of the secure communication layer. Semiconductor companies are in-
clined to create ad-hoc RFID designs that use proprietary protocols
and cryptographic algorithms [13–21]. Such designs are often kept
secret to provide security-through-obscurity. It has been shown many
times that without feedback from the scientific community, it is hard
to build secure algorithms [22, 23]. There are numerous examples in
the literature [24–39] showing that once the secrecy of an algorithm is
lost, so is its security. As long as RFID tags do not comply with open
and community-reviewed encryption standards, the security of these
tags need to be independently assessed. In order to perform these as-
sessments, we need tools to analyze the underlying security protocols.
While designing new RFID products and protocols, it is also useful to
have a set of tools at hand for easy protocol prototyping, testing and
debugging.
1.1 Our contribution
We have developed a toolbox for the analysis of RFID protocols. The
toolbox consists of three tools: the Ghost; the Proxmark; and the Lib-
nfc. Each of these tools have different characteristics and capabilities.
We focus on high frequency tags, although the Proxmark is also capa-
ble of modulating low frequency.
The Ghost is a portable and inexpensive tag emulator. It was
entirely developed at our university. This means that we have de-
veloped the hardware and firmware of the device. The Ghost was
used in [33] to reverse engineer the Crypto1 cipher and the authen-
tication protocol of the Mifare Classic. The Proxmark is slightly
more expensive (e200) but much more powerful than the Ghost. It
is fully programmable and can operate both as tag or as reader. The
Proxmark is so versatile that it can even be used for quick prototyp-
ing of non-standard protocols like reader-to-reader anti-collision [40],
the fair anti-collision protocol [41] and other protocols in the litera-
ture [42, 43].
For the Proxmark, we have developed the firmware that does the
Modified-Miller and Manchester coding which allows it to operate in
ISO/IEC 14443-A compatible mode. The Proxmark was used to im-
plement the attacks on the Mifare Classic proposed in [33, 44–48].
Next, we optimized the eavesdropping capabilities of the Proxmark
to intercept ISO/IEC 14443-B communication. This was used to
reverse engineer and attack the proprietary stream cipher of Cryp-
toRF [36,49,50]. Furthermore, we added support for Amplitude Shift
Keying (ASK) modulation and the 1 out of 4 data coding mode as
specified in the ISO/IEC 15963. This functionality was used to per-
form a security analysis of the widely used iClass cards [39, 51]. Re-
cently, we added support for the Hitag2 vehicle immobilizer transpon-
ders which operate on low frequency at 125 kHz. The practical ex-
periments of [52] show how use this feature to recover the secret key
from a car key within minutes.
Libnfc is a software package that works with most commercially-
available NFC readers. Libnfc is capable of implementing most of
the aforementioned attacks using only off-the-shelf hardware. For all
three tools we have developed software for message eavesdropping,
injection and analysis. All this software (and hardware) is open-source
(design) and publicly available1 under GNU General Public Licence.
Furthermore, the Libnfc library was used to reveal several vulnerabil-
ities in modern NFC cell-phones [53]. The experiments show that an
adversary can spread malware with a low-cost reader based on Libnfc.
1.2 Related work
The OpenPCD tool is part of an open-source and open-design high
frequency emulator. The first tools of this project consisted of the
OpenPCD and the OpenPICC which covered reader and tag emulation,
respectively. Currently, there is a second version which replaces both
tools, the OpenPCD 2. This tool covers both reader and tag emulation.
Also, this new version supports sending arbitrary bits such that attacks
like the ones described in [47, 48] can be mounted. All OpenPCD
devices highly depend on commercial RFID baseband chips. This is
not useful when research demands access beyond standardized modu-
lations, encodings and anti-collision protocols. The OpenPCD 2 sup-
ports the Libnfc utilities described in Section 5.3.
The RFID guardian [54] is, in principle, capable of doing message
eavesdropping and injection. Since it was designed for privacy protec-
tion, it is big and expensive (> 1000 USD) and it might be overkill
for the purpose of protocol analysis. To our knowledge this project is
discontinued since 2009. Throughout this paper we focus on contact-
1http://www.cs.ru.nl/
˜
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less smart cards. For contact based smart cards there are comparable
tools available in the literature [55, 56] which allows eavesdropping,
emulation, man-in-the-middle attacks [57] and fast querying by using
a dedicated FPGA.
II. RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION
There are many standards on RFID technology and a high variety of
different frequencies are available for RFID applications. The most
used frequencies are in the low frequency band at 125-134 kHz and in
the high frequency band at 13.56 MHz. We focus on the three lowest
layers of the OSI model, namely the network layer, data link layer
and the physical layer. These layers facilitate the communication up
to the bit level of messages that are sent over the air. The most relevant
standards that fall within the scope of this paper are ISO/IEC 14443
and 15693 [10, 11].
An RFID reader creates an electro-magnetic field by generating a
13.56 MHz carrier wave. This carrier provides power to a card and is
used for communication at the same time. The reader-to-card commu-
nication is in most cases achieved by interrupting the carrier wave for
very short periods (a couple of milliseconds). A contactless card that
is near the reader gets powered by induction.
At the physical layer of the communication, the sender has to
transform the information to an analog signal. This analog signal is
then captured at the receiver side and transformed back to the original
digital message that was sent. The main steps of this transformation
consist of encoding and modulation. It is important that these steps can
be reversed by first demodulating and then decoding the signal. Some-
times the reader-to-card encoding is done differently than the card-
to-reader encoding. For instance, in ISO 14443-A, Modified Miller
encoding is used for reader-to-card communication and Manchester
encoding is used for card-to-reader communication. This standard is
widely used in many RFID systems, e.g. the Mifare Classic chip from
NXP follows to a large extend this standard.
2.1 Modified Miller encoding
Modified Miller encoding is commonly used in the reader-to-card
communication. As its name suggests, Modified Miller is a slightly
adapted version of regular Miller encoding. In Miller encoding bits are
encoded by making transitions between two states of communication.
In case of ISO/IEC 14443-A, this means that the reader differentiates
over two amplitude levels. The transitions between these levels, a high
and low level, are used to encode data bits. A fixed elementary time
unit (ETU) is used to indicate the bit length or bit period.
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FIGURE 1 - MODIFIED MILLER ENCODING
ISO/IEC 14443-A uses 100% Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK)
which means that the carrier drops out completely for some small pe-
riod of time. Modified Miller is designed to make short drops in order
to keep the encoded signal high as much as possible. This is needed to
keep the card powered. A ‘0’ is encoded by a continuous high signal
except for the case of consecutive zeros. Subsequent zeros are encoded
by a drop right at the start of an ETU, see Figure 1. A ‘1’ is always
encoded by a short drop halfway an ETU.
2.2 Manchester encoding
The card also needs to communicate back to the reader. A common en-
coding technique that is used for this is Manchester encoding, which
is applied using On-Off Keying (OOK). 100% ASK comes down to
a subcarrier that is switched on or off and therefore it is equivalent
to OOK. This on-off keying of the subcarrier is also known as load
modulation. A 847.5 kHz subcarrier is used in card-to-reader commu-
nication. The encoding itself is straightforward as a ’0’ is encoded
by load modulation during the first half and a ‘1’ is encoded by load
modulation during the second half of an ETU.
2.3 Modulation techniques
There are many modulation techniques and in this section we discuss
the most common ones. Modulation is the technique of embedding
a signal into a carrier wave. This signal can either be discrete or
continuous. Modulation of a continuous signal (see Fig. 2), or so-
called analog modulation, is for instance used in radio broadcasting
where the analog audio signals are modulated using Frequency Mod-
ulation (FM) or Amplitude Modulation (AM). In RFID, discrete (or
digital) modulation is used. The signal that is being modulated con-
sists only of zeros and ones. For amplitude modulation, this results
FIGURE 2 - ANALOG AMPLITUDE MODULATION
FIGURE 3 - DIGITAL AMPLITUDE MODULATION
in a transmission signal that has only two amplitude levels (Fig. 3),
unlike the continuous change of the amplitude level in analog modu-
lation (Fig. 2). All these modulation techniques use the characteristics
of a waveform. The frequency of a wave is the number of periods
that occur within one second. One period corresponds to one cycle of
the wave. The frequency of a wave is expressed in Hertz, e.g. 1 Hz
= 1 cycle/second. The amplitude of a wave is the deviation from its
average value. The bigger the amplitude, the more energy the wave
carries. The phase of a wave is the initial angle at the origin of a sinu-
soidal function. Changing the phase of a wave can be seen as shifting
the wave in time. A carrier wave c can be described by the sinusoidal
function c = A · sin(ωt + φ) where A is the amplitude, ω is the
frequency and φ is the phase. These three parameters change the char-
acteristics of the wave. Also, differentiations in an observed wave can
be seen as changing A, ω and φ values. When the sender is able to in-
troduce these changes, and the receiver is able to detect these changes,
it is possible to communicate information. Altogether, we see three
basic ways to influence the radio communication. First, changing the
amplitude A, this is known as Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK). Then,
changing the frequency of the signal, which is known as Frequency
Shift Keying (FSK). And finally, changing the phase of the signal, this
is known as Phase Shift Keying (PSK).
2.3.1 Amplitude Shift Keying
ASK uses changes in the amplitude to modulate a digital or analog
signal into the carrier wave, see Figure 3. The most simple form of
modulation, it basically comes down to switching the carrier wave on
and off.
2.3.2 Frequency Shift Keying
In FSK, the frequency of the carrier wave changes over time in order
to communicate information. In its most simple form it is called 2-
FSK since two frequencies are used. There are several variants of
FSK that use more frequencies which allows to communicate more
than one bit of information during one ETU. The more complex 16-
FSK uses 16 different frequencies where each frequency represents 4
bits of information. The effect of changing the frequency of the carrier
wave and an example of 2-FSK is shown by Figure 4.
FIGURE 4 - FREQUENCY SHIFT KEYING
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2.3.3 Phase Shift Keying
In PSK, the phase of the carrier wave changes over time. In line with
ASK and FSK the different phases encode information. A very sim-
ple variant of PSK is BPSK (Binary PSK). In this form of phase shift
keying the signal only switches between two phases to encode infor-
mation. An example of BPSK is shown by Figure 5. BPSK is used
in the ISO/IEC 14443-B standard for card-to-reader communication.
Here the initial phase φ = 0 and represents a logic ‘1’. A phase change
of 180◦ indicates a transition of this logical value. Phase changes are
positioned at the edges of an ETU.
FIGURE 5 - PHASE SHIFT KEYING
III. GHOST
At the time of its development, there were no open source tools for the
analysis of RFID protocols. The available commercial testing equip-
ment was very expensive and focused on the verification of existing
RFID standards and certification of compatible products. The Ghost,
instead, was designed with the focus on security and to be capable of
violating those standards by sending malicious messages, also known
as protocol fuzzing. The hardware of the Ghost was designed by Peter
Dolron, member of our TechnoCentrum2 .
3.1 Hardware
The Ghost is a portable and inexpensive open-design ISO/IEC 14443-
A RFID tag emulator. It has the size of a matchbox and the total cost of
the hardware components is approximately e40. It can emulate a tag
and it is fully programable (e.g., you can emulate a custom UID). The
Ghost is controlled by a PIC18F4620 microcontroller that runs custom
firmware. This firmware controls the transmission layer which is used
for communication. It is equipped with an RS232 serial interface that
can be used to log eavesdropped transactions and to update the internal
configuration. The Ghost can work standalone as it is powered by a
9V battery.
3.2 Software
The hardware of the Ghost is very simple and limited. The embedded
firmware is responsible for the signal (de-)modulation and process-
ing. This provides great flexibility but programming it is a tedious and
time-consuming task. Additionally, we have developed the remote ap-
plication RfidSpy to configure hardware settings and to process cap-
tured data frames in real-time. This application has a graphical user
interface and runs under Microsoft Windows. With this software it is
possible to change the UID, capture data and define custom responses
to certain messages. Using the eavesdrop functionality it is possible
to eavesdrop frames transmitted by the reader. The man-in-the-middle
mode relays all communication to the PC. Finally, the emulation mode
mimics the behavior of simple (i.e., without encryption) tags like the
Mifare Ultralight.
2http://www.ru.nl/fnwi/technocentrum/
FIGURE 6 - THE GHOST
FIGURE 7 - THE PROXMARK III
3.3 Capabilities
The Ghost is a tag emulator which has two modes of operation.
3.3.1 Eavesdropping mode
In this mode, the Ghost eavesdrops frames that are sent by a reader.
The Ghost does not respond to any frame, in this way it will not inter-
fere with active transactions that are communicated between a reader
and a genuine tag. The Ghost cannot demodulate the Manchester sig-
nal from a tag, it is only capable to understand the messages sent by the
reader. If the protocol is not session-dependent, it is possible to replay
the eavesdropped reader frames (using your own reader) to gather the
missing answers from the tag. If there was a cryptographic challenge
during the communication, the replay of the reader frames would not
be useful.
3.3.2 Emulation mode
This mode transforms the Ghost into a lightweight tag. The user can
supply a UID which is used in the anti-collision. Additionally, the
user can provide some answers to predefined reader messages. Then,
the Ghost simulates the responses during a replay attack. After its
configuration, the Ghost can be disconnected from the computer and
used as a standalone device, in this way it is compact and easy to hide.
Several access control and transport ticketing systems use constant
identifiers, like serial numbers, for authentication. We have performed
a replay attack [5–7] for low-cost disposable tickets used in public
transport systems like the OV-chipkaart3. Every off-line system that
uses non-encrypted memory cards like the Mifare Ultralight is vulner-
able to such attacks.
IV. PROXMARK
The Proxmark III hardware has been developed by Jonathan West-
hues 4. The Proxmark III, shown in Figure 7, replaces its predecessors
and introduces a high level of flexibility in both signal processing and
protocol implementation. It is additionally equipped with a Field Pro-
grammable Gate Array (FPGA) which is mainly responsible for the
low-level signal processing and allows to set up multiple signal pro-
cessing schemes. In general, when we speak about the Proxmark, we
refer to this latest version.
The hardware design and firmware of this latest version is in the
public domain since May 2007 under the General Public License. The
device costs around e200 and since the schematics are online, it can
be ordered through any local printed circuit board (PCB) supplier. Al-
though, most assembled Proxmark devices are sold by one of the main
suppliers: Rysc Corp.5, GeZhi Electronic Corp. Ltd.6 and hackable-
devices7. The following websites contain all the information that is
required to assemble, compile, flash, use and develop new features for
the Proxmark.
3http://www.ov-chipkaart.nl
4http://cq.cx/proxmark3.pl
5http://www.proxmark3.com
6http://www.xfpga.com
7http://www.hackable-devices.org
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• http://cq.cx/proxmark3.pl The first website about the
Proxmark device, created by Jonathan Westhues in 2007. Jonathan
made the project free to use and published all the necessary designs
and source codes. Five years later, already more than a thousand Prox-
marks were sold for extensive RFID protocol and security research.
• http://www.proxmark.org Contains a lot of information
about new RFID modulation, encoding and protocols that were added
the last years. This website hosts the main community forum, which
is currently used by more than 3000 members. This forum answers all
frequently asked questions concerning the Proxmark, but also contains
various topics about microcontroller and FPGA development.
• http://proxmark3.googlecode.com This is the develop-
ment website which hosts the most recent subversion (SVN) repos-
itory. Only in 2012 there are already 26 active committers, who
regularly fix problems and contribute new features to the Proxmark
firmware. The website also hosts a small wiki that contains a manual
for using the Proxmark device. Most features and commands are ex-
plained in detail, backed up by several output examples and pictures.
4.1 Hardware
The Proxmark III supports both low (125 kHz-134 kHz) and high fre-
quency (13.56 MHz) signal processing. This is achieved by two par-
allel antenna circuits that can be used independently. Both circuits
are connected to a 4-pin Hirose connector to connect an external loop
antenna. When the Proxmark is in reader mode it drives the antenna
coils with the appropriate frequency. This is unnecessary when the
Proxmark works in eavesdropping mode or in card emulation mode
because then the electromagnetic field is generated by the reader. The
signal from the antenna is routed through the FPGA after it has been
digitized by an 8-bit Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC). After some
filtering, the FPGA relays the necessary information to perform the
decoding of the signal to the microcontroller. This prevents the mi-
crocontroller from being overloaded with signal data. An FPGA has a
great advantage over a normal microcontroller in the sense that it em-
ulates hardware. A hardware description can be compiled and flashed
into an FPGA. Basic arithmetic operations can be performed in paral-
lel and faster than in a microcontroller. An FPGA is of course slower
than a hardware implementation but pure hardware lacks flexibility.
4.1.1 FPGA implementation
We will now discuss the FPGA implementation of the ISO/IEC
14443-A standard in the Proxmark. This is implemented in the
hi iso14443a module. This module is implemented in Verilog,
a hardware description language. In short, the FPGA is used for
the modulation and demodulation part of the digital signal processing
(DSP). We implemented the ASK modulation scheme on the FPGA
and the Modified Miller and Manchester encoding schemes at the mi-
crocontroller. The FPGA samples at a clock speed of 13.56 MHz and
sends the bits that describe the transitions of the modulated signal to
the microcontroller. These bits are sent at a rate of 8 samples per
period (847.5 kbps) for the reader-to-card signal. The FPGA code de-
fines several modules that all make use of the same interfaces. A mul-
tiplexer switches between the FPGA modules that cover the high and
low frequency processing. Every module runs with different param-
eters that are specific for sending, receiving and eavesdropping. The
following modules (operating modes) are implemented for ISO/IEC
14443-A. Eavesdroppping (Mode 0); Samples the reader-to-card as
well as card-to-reader communication at 1.7 Mbps. Card listening
(Mode 1); Samples reader communication at 847.5 kbps. Card trans-
mitting (Mode 2); Modulates card-to-reader communication and gen-
erates a subcarrier. Reader listening (Mode 3); Samples card-to-reader
communication at 847.5 kbps and generates a carrier wave. Reader
transmitting (Mode 4); Modulates reader-to-card communication and
generates a carrier wave.
The Proxmark switches seamlessly between these operating
modes. This is especially important when switching between trans-
mod type ssp clk pwr hi pwr oe4
3’b000 (0) clk2 0 0
3’b001 (1) clk3 0 0
3’b010 (2) clk3 0 clk3 & mod sig coil
3’b011 (3) clk3 clk1 & mod sig coil 0
3’b100 (4) clk3 clk1 0
Where clk1 = 13.56 MHz, clk2 = 1.695 MHz, clk3 = 847.5 KHz
FIGURE 9 - OVERVIEW OF THE INTERFACES
mitting and listening in the reader simulation modes (mode 3 and 4).
If the Proxmark stops generating a field for a short moment this will
result in the card losing its power and thus its current state.
4.1.2 Analog-to-Digital Converter
The Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC) transfers the analog input
voltage of the antenna to a digital representation. The Proxmark uses
an 8-bit ADC (TLC5540) which divides the analog input into 256 out-
put steps. Two reference voltages on input pins REFB and REFT cor-
respond to the bottom and top input of the input range, respectively.
This input range is divided in equally sized digital steps.
A
D
C
FIGURE 8 - ADC WIRING
The analog input signal is con-
nected to the ANALOG-IN pin of
the ADC. The digitized output sig-
nal is put onto eight parallel out-
put lines (D1-D8) that connect the
ADC and FPGA. These lines are
clearly visible on the Proxmark cir-
cuit board and are shown as bold
lines in Figure 8.
4.1.3 FPGA interfaces
We will now discuss the most important input and output interfaces
that are defined on the FPGA. A 13.56 MHz crystal is used for the
high frequency FPGA modes. Once every period of the carrier wave,
the FPGA evaluates the digital output of the ADC and processes this
information into samples that are sent out to the ARM. Furthermore,
the FPGA has two outputs (pwr lo and pwr hi) that are used to gen-
erate a low frequency or high frequency field. Apart from the carrier
signal, the FPGA also controls four outputs that determine the level of
load modulation on the signal. This comes into use when emulating
a transponder. Figure 9 gives a quick overview of the signals on the
most important output pins for the different FPGA modes.
4.1.4 Decoding and sampling reader-to-card communication
Decoding reader communication is easier compared to decoding card
communication since the reader controls the field and can easily
introduce signal changes. A card can only induce small changes in the
reader field. The ISO/IEC 14443-A standard defines a default bit rate
of fc/128 ≈ 106 kbit/s with fc = 13.56 MHz. This means that one
bit is transmitted every 128 clock cycles of the carrier wave. Recall
from Section 2.1 that the reader-to-card communication for ISO/IEC
14443-A is encoded by Modified Miller. In this encoding scheme
the signal is high at default. Information is encoded by dropping the
reader field for very short periods at certain time intervals. These
drops last 1
4
· 128 = 32 clock cycles and occur at most once per
bit period of 128 cycles. Following the Nyquist theorem we sample
at twice the frequency of our encoded signal. This means that the
FPGA samples the reader-to-card communication every 16 cycles.
These samples are sent in binary format to the micorcontroller. The
following bit string is an example of this communication from the
FPGA to the microcontroller.
. . . 1111
SOF
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00111111
0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
00111111
1
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11110011
1
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11110011
0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
11111111
00111111
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
11110011
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
11111111
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
0011111111111111
︸ ︷︷ ︸
EOF
1111 . . .
This bit string encodes the REQA command8 which is sent out by the
8The Request Type A command is used to select a card that (partly) supports ISO/IEC
14443-A.
4
reader continuously when it is polling for new cards. It consists of 7
bits (a so-called short frame) and is like all reader frames enclosed by
a Start-of-Frame (SOF) and an End-of-Frame (EOF).
4.1.5 Decoding and sampling card-to-reader communication
In case of eavesdropping or reader simulation the Proxmark demodu-
lates card signals. In order to do this, a more refined method is needed
compared to the reader decoding. The main reason for this is that the
card is powered by the reader field. It communicates to the reader by
generating a subcarrier. This subcarrier affects the power level that
is received by the Proxmark antenna. Although this induces changes
in the power level, the changes are far more subtle and thus harder to
detect. It is for this reason that reader communication can be eaves-
dropped at much larger distances than card communication. Despite
the weaker signal of the card, the default bit rate is also 106 kbit/s. The
communication is Manchester encoded as described in Section 2.2.
During communication, half the bit periods have a modulated subcar-
rier, and half the bit periods do not contain any modulation. These
periods last 64 cycles of the carrier wave and are twice as long as the
signal drops in reader-to-card communication. However, the power
variations are very small and the positioning of the card in the reader
field highly influences the signal impedance. Therefore, a standard
static threshold technique is not suitable in this situation. We use an
adaptive progressive thresholding technique instead. It is a real-time
problem where, at every period of the 13.56 MHz wave, the FPGA has
to decide whether a transition took place or not. It is not feasible to re-
consider earlier points in time. The thresholding technique that we use
is adaptive since a variable threshold value is used at different points
in time. Furthermore, it is progressive since it scans the digital signal
for extremes and adjusts the thresholds according to these extremes.
The FPGA implementation averages the ADC output over 16
periods of the carrier wave. When the difference between two
consecutive averages exceeds a threshold value it is counted as a
transition. After every evaluation, the threshold value is updated to the
difference between the last two averages. This corrects automatically
for a too sensitive threshold value. On the other hand, a too insensitive
threshold value is prevented by automatically resetting it to its initial
value after a period without transitions. Concretely, it is impossible
to have more than one bit period (8 samples) without transitions
according to the ISO/IEC 14443-A standard. In our FPGA code we
take some additional margin into account and reset the threshold after
16 identical samples. The following bit string is an example of what
is send from the FPGA to the microcontroller.
. . . 0000 11110000
︸ ︷︷ ︸
SOF
00001111
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
11110000
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
00001111
︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
11110000
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
11111111
︸ ︷︷ ︸
EOF
1100 . . .
This bit string encodes the acknowledgement (ACK ) of a Mifare Clas-
sic card to some reader command. It consists of 4 bits and is like all
card frames enclosed by a SOF and an EOF.
4.1.6 Microcontroller
The microcontroller is responsible for the protocol part. It receives
the digital signal from the FPGA and decodes it. The decoded signal
can just be copied to a buffer in the EEPROM memory. Additionally,
an answer to an incoming message can be programmed to be sent im-
mediately, communicating this to the FPGA which then modulates the
appropriate signal.
4.2 Extending protocol support
The Proxmark can operate in three different mores: eavesdropping
mode; card emulation mode; and reader mode. It is possible to use
the Proxmark for very different modulation schemes and protocols
as long as they are in the supported frequency range. Some well
known protocols and modulation schemes are already available like
the ISO/IEC 14443-A implementation that we discussed earlier. There
are some requirements to implement the mentioned different modes
for new protocols. First, an underlying physical layer is needed that
takes care of the Digital Signal Processing (DSP). This is mostly done
at the FPGA. Then, the encoding and decoding schemes should be
implemented as functions on the microcontroller. Finally, the client
should be able to call these functions in order to emulate a tag or reader
and display the results. The hardware design that can be flashed into
the FPGA is written in Verilog. Verilog is a hardware description lan-
guage which allows to describe a hardware design in a C-style syntax.
The client application (originally written by Jonathan Westhues
and later improved by the Proxmark community) connects to the Prox-
mark via the standard HID USB protocol. Since the microcontroller
polls for new USB packets, it is not possible to stream the retrieved
samples to the PC in real-time. When the microcontroller retrieves a
command from the client it runs this command and stores any result-
ing messages in its memory buffer. Later, the client needs to send a
new command to receive the data from this buffer.
4.3 Capabilities
This section describes the strong points of the Proxmark. In general,
most of its flexibility comes from the software defined protocol stack
that is implemented on the FPGA and the microcontroller.
4.3.1 Supporting user defined modulation
It is possible to develop new modulation and protocol interpreters
by only adjusting the software. It supports Amplitude Shift Keying
(ASK), Binary Phase Shift Keying (BPSK) and On-Off Keying (OOK)
for two major RFID frequencies 125-135 kHz and 13.56 MHz. We
have initiated a small but steadily growing community9 of Proxmark
developers. By now there is support for various widely used RFID
tags like SRI512, Mifare, ICODE SLI, EM4200, Nedap, iClass, In-
dala, HID Prox. Using these open source examples it is rather easy to
add support for new RFID modulations and protocols.
4.3.2 Eavesdropping modulation schemes simultaneously
The Proxmark is capable of simultaneously eavesdropping Modified
Miller and Manchester modulated communication. As both modula-
tion techniques are part of one ISO/IEC 14443-A session, it is possi-
ble to get both reader and tag messages in one capture. To analyze
unknown RFID protocols it is very convenient to get a full trace of
the transaction. This feature was of great use in the attack proposed
in [33, 58] to retrieve the 64 bits keystream from one authentication
session to construct the optimized table attack exploiting linear com-
binations from the CRYPTO1 cipher.
4.3.3 Mifare Classic emulation
We have implemented the CRYPTO1 cipher in the Proxmark. This
enables emulation of Mifare Classic from both tag and reader side.
This feature is of great aid while assessing the security of integrated
systems like access control and public transport systems. It is espe-
cially useful to assess the identity fraud detection mechanisms of such
systems. We successfully attacked several systems using this feature
and pointed out the weak spots to the system integrators.
4.3.4 Timing information
Since the demodulation is done in real-time by the FPGA, the Prox-
mark provides accurate timing information. This is very useful for
the study of potential side channel attacks. Pseudo Random Number
Generators (PRNG) often rely on timing. When an attacker can ob-
serve the related time in such a manner that the generator becomes
predictable, a security scheme can not rely anymore on the assump-
tion of an unpredictable PRNG. This feature can help to discover re-
lations between the timing information and the numbers generated by
the PRNG of a tag. This feature was used to recover the PRNG timing
relation of a Mifare Classic tags in [33, 45]. This relation was also
exploited later in [47].
V. LIBNFC
Near Field Communication (NFC) is an open platform technology that
provide wireless communication between devices that are compatible
9http://www.proxmark.org/forum
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with the ISO/IEC 18092 [59] and ISO/IEC 21481 [60] standard. It was
proposed as a unifying successor for the available RFID technologies.
The NFC standard wraps older RFID modulations like the ISO/IEC
14443 [10], ISO/IEC 15693 [11] and JIS X 6319-4 [12]. There are a
number of devices compatible with NFC technology like GSM phones
and other peripheral computer equipment10.
5.1 Hardware
The NFC Controllers used by major manufacturers (Nokia, NXP,
Sony, etc.) are based on the NXP 80C51 microprocessor as described
in [61]. These chips are pre-configured with an embedded firmware
and distributed as controller IC’s PN531, PN532 and PN533. Most
mobile phones, POS terminals and desktop NFC devices are using this
controller. They are cheap, reliable, support advanced features and are
very easy to use. The chips can be interfaced through a UART, SPI,
I2C and USB connection. The controller just needs to be connected
to the antenna and is ready to connect directly to a computer using
the USB interface. In practice, manufactures often choose to put a IC
in between the controller and the computer that performs some pro-
prietary functionality. The IC might run an embedded firmware and
run standalone. Since one chip is enough to support all NFC com-
munication, this brings the average price of an NFC device down to
e30. Together with MicroBuilder SARL11 we designed and build an
open hardware board that is fully supported by Libnfc. The schemat-
ics, components and hardware design is completely open and released
under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported
License. A picture of this reader is shown in Fig 10.
FIGURE 10 - OPEN DESIGN LIBNFC READER
There are three different communication interfaces available,
which can be configured with two jumpers. It supports the Serial Pe-
ripheral Interface (SPI) bus, Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) and Uni-
versal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART). The SPI and I2C
are dedicated communication lines with their own transmission clock.
Both require four wires and are often deployed in embedded devices
that use a master-slave controlling environment. The UART inter-
face is slower, but it requires only two wires and is since decades a
widely deployed communication channel. The UART interface is con-
venient for backwards compatibility with regular personal computers
and older embedded devices. Because of the low production costs of
this Libnfc device, the connecting capabilities and the ease of config-
uring, it is eminently for quickly prototyping of new NFC designs.
5.2 Software
There are various commercial SDK’s1213 available for NFC. They are
hardware dependant and use proprietary software. They are not plat-
form independent and give no transparency over their functionality.
Most NFC readers are using the PN53X chipset. These chips have
an extensive firmware which supports lots of features. These features
are invoked by a simple instruction set, the TAMA language. Most
SDK developers allow TAMA instructions to bypass their own layer
and are sent directly to the NFC controller. Libnfc makes use of this
property. Since the TAMA language is the same for all commercial
NFC readers, it is possible to have a library that supports NFC readers
10http://www.libnfc.org/hardware/compatibility
11http://www.microbuilder.eu/Projects/PN532
12http://www.stollmann.de/en/stacks/nfc/
13http://www.acs.com.hk/acr122-sdk.php
from different vendors. The source code from Libnfc is portable to
different platforms. So far, it has been tested on Linux, Mac OS X
and Windows. OpenPICC214 shows that it is possible to compile Lib-
nfc into an embedded firmware so that it can be used in a standalone
device.
The API of Libnfc consists of three sections. The first part covers
the general functionality, like the connection and configuration of an
NFC device. The second part focuses on the NFC device as an RFID
reader (initiator in NFC terms). The automatic initialization of vari-
ous tags can be invoked by just one function call. The firmware of the
NFC Controller will handle the modulation, startup and selection pro-
cess. However, this can also be done manually using the raw-frames
transceiver functionality. It supplies the feature to send arbitrary parity
bits, optional CRC bytes and custom frame-lengths. This gives the de-
veloper great control over the frames transmitted by the NFC device.
The last part focuses on tag (target in NFC terms) emulation. It sup-
ports comparable features with the Initiator part. Besides, it is possible
to let the NFC controller emulate a tag automatically. These features
enables developers to prototype proposals from the literature [62, 63]
that rely on the NFC interface as communication channel.
5.3 Capabilities
The library contains different drivers for NFC devices available from
most major manufacturers. Developers using Libnfc might abstract
from which device or interface (USB, SERIAL, I2C) to the NFC con-
troller is being used. This makes the development vendor independent
and thereby prevents vendor lock-ins. There are five example utilities
included in the Libnfc package. Every utility demonstrates a powerful
feature of Libnfc using only a few lines of code. These utilities can be
used as kick start for developing new software. In this section there is
a brief description of each of them.
5.3.1 Anticol
Anti-collision demonstration tool for ISO/IEC 14443-A tags allows
sending custom of anti-collision frames. The first frame must be a
short frame which is only 7 bits long. Commercial SDK’s often don’t
support a feature to send frames that are not a multiple of 8 bits (1
byte) long. The developer has to rely on closed proprietary software
and should hope it does not contain vulnerabilities during the anti-
collision phase. Performing the anti-collision using custom frames
could protect against a malicious tag that, for example, violates the
standard by sending frames with unsupported lengths.
5.3.2 Emulate
Tag emulation is one of the main added features NFC. To avoid abuse
of existing systems, manufacturers of the NFC controller intention-
ally did not support emulation of custom UID numbers. The emu-
late tool demonstrates that this can still be done using transmission of
raw-frames. It is necessary to respond in time for the anti-collision
protocol. The USB interface introduces response delays, but an em-
bedded microprocessor is fast enough to emulate a tag with any UID.
This makes it a serious thread for security systems that rely only on
the uniqueness of the UID.
5.3.3 List
The list utility attempts to select available tags in the field. The NFC
controller is used to perform the selection procedure. This is different
for each modulation type. It tries to find a ISO/IEC 14443 type A, type
B, Felica or Jewel Topaz tags. This tool demonstrates that it is possible
to setup a simple NFC system using less than 10 lines of code.
5.3.4 MFtool
The Mifare Classic tag is one of the most widely used RFID tags. The
firmware in the NFC controller supports authenticating, reading and
writing to/from Mifare Classic tags. This tool demonstrate the speed
of this library and its ease-of-use. It possible to read and write the
complete content of a Mifare Classic 4K tag within 1 second.
14http://www.libnfc.org/hardware/devices/openpicc2
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5.3.5 Relay
The relay utility demonstrates a relay attack. For this it requires two
NFC devices. One will emulate an ISO/IEC 14443 type A tag, while
the second device will act as a reader. The genuine tag can be placed
on the 2nd reader and the tag emulator can be placed close to the origi-
nal reader. All communication is now relayed and shown in the screen
on real-time.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented three tools that should satisfy the needs of most
RFID researchers. Those having an NFC reader can already start scru-
tinizing several RFID protocols using Libnfc. Those who need precise
timing information or quick response times should get their hands on
a Proxmark III. This is by far the most powerful of the tools presented
here, but its operation requires some training. Finally, if you need an
inexpensive and portable standalone tag emulator and you only need
modest computing power, you can build a Ghost. All these tools are
available under the GNU General Public License so feel free to con-
tribute and expand the community.
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